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Abstract 
 
 
This study attempts to answer how the U.S and the ASEAN-5 stock markets’ indices would 
interrelate during the periods of stock market turmoil. The multivariate time series analyses 
conducted on the series reveal that there are cointegrating relationships on the series of the 
two sub-sample periods of the 1997 and the 2002 crisis. However, the study fails to detect 
any cointegrating vector on the series during the 2007 crisis.  
 
The granger causality tests applied to the series reveal that the number of significant causal 
linkages between two variables on the series rocketed during the 2007 crisis. In addition, the 
accounting innovation analysis shows an increase in the explanatory power of an endogenous 
variable to another in the system during the latest crisis, indicating that the contagious effect 
of the latest crisis had not only largely influenced, but also dramatically changed the pattern 
of the short run dynamic interaction of the six capital markets.  
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Background 
 
 
A number of studies have been conducted on stock market interdependence around the period 
of financial or stock market crises in Asia-Pacific region. The general consensus is that the 
degree of integration among countries tends to change with a stronger integration during 
crisis periods than that before and after the periods (Sheng and Tu, 2000, and Yang, Kolari, 
and Min, 2003). It is also interesting to note that U.S stock market has played an important 
role in most national and regional stock markets, including some Asian’s stock markets 
during the 1997 crisis (Sheng et al, 2000).  
 
This study attempts to extend the analysis and examination presented in the previous papers 
on the stock market interrelation during crisis periods by including the (2007) recent financial 
crisis. This study emphasises on whether there is a significant difference in the stock market 
indices interrelation during the (1997) Asian financial crisis, the 2002 stock market downturn, 
as well as the 2007 crisis. This is an interesting issue because those crises are quite different 
in terms of the phenomena and factors causing them. The Asian financial crisis is an 
indication of a mixture of both economic crisis and panic as a result of the weak and collapse 
of Asia’s financial systems (Sheng et al, 2000). Triggered by the sharp depreciation in the 
Thai baht in the midst of 1997, the disastrous effects of the 1997 financial crisis broadly 
spread out to the South East Asia (ASEAN) financial markets which were dominated by bank 
loan and portfolio investment (DFAT, 1999:29). Market capitalization of the countries’ stock 
market was largely contracted due to a deep depreciation in their stock prices causing their 
stock indices then sharply plunged. The crisis then extensively affected the world financial 
markets through its contagion effects.  
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The 2002 stock market downturn, meanwhile, originally hit the US stock markets. The 
downturn can be viewed as part of a larger correction in the US stock market triggered by 
some factors, including the September 11 attacks; an outbreak of accounting scandals; 
bankruptcy of some dotcom companies. This large stock market downturn, in fact, caused 
investors’ confidence suffered, and influenced other national stock exchanges.  
 
The (2007) recent crisis also sparked in the U.S. in the second semester of 2007. At the time, 
the US financial market was deeply suffered from the most significant economic shocks 
initiated by the sub-prime mortgage crisis leading to the downturn in housing market, and 
then worsened by the spike in commodity prices (Yellen, 2008). Webb (2009) mentions that 
this crisis is a representation of hubris or an overconfidence that the previously smooth 
system will never fail or even collapse.  The devastating effects of the US financial market 
turmoil then widely spread throughout the world. 
 
The focus of this study is particularly on the stock market interdependence among national 
equity indices in six countries, which are the US; Singapore; Indonesia; Malaysia; Thailand; 
and the Philippines, during the three crisis periods. The multivariate time series is employed 
to analyse the degree and the existence of the long-run equilibrium, as well as to explain the 
short-run dynamic interactions among the indices in three sub sample periods. The study is 
structured as following: Section One describes the condition of the six stock markets in 
different periods; Section Two reviews the literature; Section Three discusses the research 
methodology; Section Four presents the empirical results; Section Five concludes. 
 
Literature  Review 
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The basic theoretical concept of financial market integration is laid on the law of one price. In 
integrated financial markets, the assets with the same risk in different markets will result in 
the same yield when measured in a common currency (Stulz, 1981). However, if the yields 
are different across the markets, the arbitrage process will play an important role in 
eliminating the differences. Operationally capital markets integration refers to the extent that 
markets’ participants are enabled and obligated to take notice of events occurring in other 
markets by using all available information and opportunities, while financial market 
integration is defined in terms of price interdependence between markets (Kenen 1976). 
 
Roca (2000) states that stock market integration is affected by some factors, such as 
economic integration (Eun and Shim, 1989), multiple listing of stocks, regulatory and 
information barriers, institutionalisation and securitisation, and market contagion (King and 
Wadwhani 1990), which may significantly determine the dynamic relationships among stock 
markets (Climent and Meneu, 2003), even though in the case of emerging markets, the 
contagion effect could be smaller than what is widely perceived (Pretorius 2002). 
 
Much research has been carried out in order to find and analyse the existence of integration or 
long-run equilibrium in stock market across countries. The results are different depending on 
where, when, and how the research has been conducted. Palac-McMiken (1997) also reveals 
the existence of cointegration in ASEAN markets
1
 (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the 
Philippines), except Indonesia, during 1987 to 1995. The result is confirmed by Masih and 
Masih (1999) who report that some of ASEAN countries (Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore) 
have a high degree of interdependence with other Asian (Hong Kong and Japan) and 
developed (the U.S. and the U.K.) stock markets. Furthermore, Masih and Masih (2001) also 
                                               
1  Other researchers, which have also been conducted some studies on ASEAN stock market integration, are Hee 
(2000, 2002), Wongbangpo (2000), Ibrahim (2000, 2005), Azman-Saini et al. (2002), Daly (2003) and Cheng, 
Leng, and Lian (2003). 
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find one cointegration vector among several major Asian stock markets (Hong Kong, Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan) and major developed markets.  
 
Somewhat contradicts with those of Chung and Liu (1994) and Masih et al. (1999), Chan, 
Gup and Pan (1992) and DeFusco, Geppert and Tsetsekos (1996) also mention that there is 
no cointegration between the U.S and several Asian emerging stock markets (Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines) in the 1980s and early 
1990s. Interestingly, Pretorius (2002) reports that the stock markets of countries in the same 
region are more interdependent than those in different regions. Consistent with this finding, 
Roca (2000) reveals the existence of interdependency among all the ASEAN stock markets in 
the short run, but not in the long run, during 1988-1995. These findings imply that the 
interdependence among stock markets is not stable over time as it is also mentioned by 
Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993).  
 
Arshanapalli, Doukas and Lang (1995), furthermore, show that after the 1987 crisis the stock 
markets in emerging markets (Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) and developed 
markets (Hong Kong, Singapore, the U.S., and Japan) are more interdependent as they found 
cointegration in the post-crisis period, but not in the pre-crisis period. Other researchers, Liu, 
Pan and Shieh (1998) also confirm that there is an increase in the interdependence within 
Asian-Pacific regional markets and the stock markets post-the 1987 crisis. Similarly, Sheng et 
al (2000) document one cointegration vector between the U.S. and several Asian stock 
markets (Taiwan, Malaysia, China, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, 
Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) during the crisis, but none in the years before 
the crisis, when they observed the stock markets using daily data.  
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A research conducted by Yang et al (2003) examine the long-run relationship and short-run 
dynamic causal linkages among the U.S, Japanese, and ten Asian emerging markets using 
daily data of 1997-1998 periods. They confirm that the stock markets in those countries had 
been more integrated after the 1997 Asian financial crisis than before the crisis. Both long-
run cointegration relationship and short-run causal linkages in those markets become stonger 
during the period of crisis. Meanwhile, Atmadja, Wu and Juli (2009) find cointegration 
relationship among the eight Asia – Pacific (the U.S, Australia, Japan, Taiwan, Hongkong, 
China, Korea, and Indonesia) stock indices in the 2007 crisis period, but not in the 1997 
crisis. Moreover, they also reveal that the short run dynamic interaction among the indices to 
be more intense along the examination periods.  
 
Research Methodology 
 
Data  and Samples 
The daily closing stock price indices of the NYSE Composite of New York Stock Exchange-
USA (NYSEALL) and the five ASEAN countries, which are Jakarta SE Composite 
(JAKCOM) of Indonesia; Kuala Lumpur SE Composite (KLSE) of Malaysia; Philippine SE 
Index (PSEi) of the Philippines; Straits Times Index (STI) of Singapore; and Bangkok - SET 
Composite of Thailand, would be used as measurement of the countries’ daily stock index 
movements in the observed periods. 
 
The indices data would then be transformed into natural logarithm forms before conducting 
the analyses, and be clustered into three sub-sample periods, as follows: 
7 
 
1. The 1997 crisis: from July 1997 – March 1999. This period classification is somewhat 
similar with the one suggested by some researches (Kamin, 1999,  Corsetti, Pesenti and 
Roubini,1999, Sheng et al., 2000, and Yang et al., 2003). 
2. The 2002 Stock market downturn period begun in March 2002 and ended in December 
2003 when the level of indices sat back at their same level before the crisis.  
3. The  2007 crisis: from July 2007 – June 2009, as it is mentioned by Yellen (2008). 
 
Empirical Framework 
The two most appropriate models of multivariate time series analysis framework that one of 
which may suitable for this study are VAR and VECM. In the Vector autoregressive model 
(VAR) all variables are endogenous, and symmetrically treated. A VAR could be very large, 
however, in standard form, it could be written as : 
   p 
xt = o + ∑ i xt-i + t 
     
i = 1 
 
VAR requires that all variables be stationary
2
, and the appropriate lag length is data driven 
(Brooks, 2002). To define the appropriate lag length, some tests of information criteria will 
be applied, including the likelihood ratio (LR) test; Akaike Information Criterion (AIC); and 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SC).   
 
The LR test is based on asymptotic theory and is an F-type approximation. This test actually 
compares a restricted VAR (less lags) to an unrestricted VAR (more lags), which the null 
hypothesis is that the restricted model is correct. However, the shortcoming of the test is that 
                                               
2  There are several available tests for testing for a unit root, however the Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test 
would be carried out to test the series.  Non-stationary variables may be made stationary by differencing or 
detrending process. 
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it may not be useful in small samples. It is worth noting that the LR test is only valid when 
the restricted model is tested.  
 
Because of the limitation of the likelihood ratio test, multivariate generalization of AIC and 
SC may be the most suitable alternatives. The minimum values of AIC and/or SC could 
validly indicate the appropriate lags length, as long as the model’s residual does not suffer 
from serial correlation problem. Otherwise, the lag length may be too short. Thus, it is 
necessary to re-estimate the model using lag length that is serially uncorrelated. 
 
In VAR, a block causality test, which is the Pairwise Granger Causality / Block Exogenity 
Wald Tests based on VAR, would be used to examine whether the lags of one variable enter 
into the equation for another variable.  If y1 granger-causes y2, the parameters of lags of y1 
should then not equal zero in the equation of y2. However, it is worth noting that granger-
causality basically means a correlation between the current value of one variable and the past 
(lags) value of others. Instead, Granger causality simply implies a chronological ordering of 
movements of the series.  
 
As an alternative of VAR, the vector error correction model (VECM) or cointegration 
framework analysis could be a correct toolkit to analyze the series, if only the series contain 
unit root. The VECM basically is a VAR augmented by the error correction term (êt-1), which 
takes the form as : 
   p 
xt = o + ∑ i xt-i + ′ xt-1 + vt 
     
i = 1 
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Thus, if the parameters of error correction term (ECT), called speed of adjustments () in 
VECM, are zero, then VECM reverts to a VAR in first differences. Otherwise, the larger the 
speed of adjustments, the greater the response to previous periods’ deviation from the long 
run equilibrium. A cointegration relationship is a long term or equilibrium phenomenon, 
since it is possible that cointegrating variables may deviate from their relationship in the short 
run, but their association would return in the long run
3
. Since the VECM result is also 
sensitive to its lags length, it is essential to use appropriate lag length to get the appropriate 
outcomes by conducting the lag order selection criteria (LR, AIC, or SC) tests.   
 
Cointegration requires that all variables in a model be integrated with the same order. Ones 
may use the Engle-Granger (EG) test, which is basically a residuals-based approach, or the 
Johansen Cointegration Test to test the existence of cointegrated variables. Johansen (1988, 
1991) proposed the maximum likelihood based two statistics to test the rank of the long-run 
information, namely: 
 
max (r, r + 1) =  – T  ln(1 – r+1) 
 
 
trace (r) =  – T  ln(1 – i) 
 
where i are estimated Eigenvalues (characteristic roots) ranked from largest to smallest. The 
trace is a likelihood ratio test statistics for the hypotheses that are at most r cointegrating 
vectors. The max is the maximal Eigenvalue statistic that tests the hypothesis of r 
cointegrating vectors against the hypothesis of r – 1 cointegrating vectors. If Eigenvalues i’s 
are all zero, then the trace and max will be zero. To test for the number of cointegrating 
                                               
3 ‘A principal feature of cointegrated variable is that their time paths are influenced by the extent of any 
deviation from long run equilibrium. After all, if the system is to return to long run equilibrium, the 
movements of at least some of the variables must respond to the magnitude of the disequilibrium.’ (Enders, 
2004). 
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vectors, this study employs Johansen and Juselius’s (1990) trace and max statistics that are 
adjusted for the degree of freedom. In the case of a cointegration relationship does not exist, a 
VAR analysis in first difference will then be the correct specification to conduct the 
estimation. 
 
Following the VECM estimation, the VEC Pairwise Granger Causality / Block Exogenity 
Wald Tests is applied to reveal block-causality relationship between two variables. If there is 
a block causality relationship between the both variables, then lags of a variable should be 
significant in the equation for another.  
 
A direct interpretation of the cointegration relations, may be difficult or misleading 
(Lutkepohl and Reimers, 1992, Runkle, 1987). As in a traditional VAR analysis, innovation 
accounting analysis, which consists of Impulse Response and Variance Decomposition 
Analysis, can provide a solution to the interpretation problem, and might be the most 
appropriate method to explore the short run dynamic structure of market linkages (Yang et 
al., 2003). This analysis would answer whether changes in the value of a given variable have 
positive or negative effect on the other variables in the system, or how long it would affect 
the variable to work through the system.  
 
An impulse response analysis, traces the effect of a one-time shock to one of the innovations 
on current and future values of the endogenous variables. A shock to the i-th variable not 
only affects the i-th variable directly, but it is also transmitted to all of the other endogenous 
variables through the dynamic (lag) structure of the VAR. The analysis reveals the 
responsiveness of the dependent variables in VAR to shocks on individual error terms. This 
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study employs the generalized
4
 type of impulse responses analysis since the orthogonalized 
type is sensitive to the ordering of the variable in the system.  
 
Forecast error variance decomposition analysis, meanwhile, refers to the proportion of the 
movements in a sequence due to its own shock versus shocks to the other variables. The 
analysis separates the variation in an endogenous variable into the component shocks to the 
system. The variance decomposition, therefore, provides information about the relative 
importance of each random innovation in affecting the variables in the system. It determines 
how much of the s-step ahead forecast error variance of a given variable is explained by 
innovations to each explanatory variable. To some extent, impulse responses and variance 
decompositions offer very similar information. 
 
Empirical Results 
 
The ADF tests applied on the series in the three sub-sample periods result in that all series in 
all sub-sample periods contain unit root, meaning that the series are non stationary. The 
examination then continues with determining the appropriate lags length of the series by 
using the information criteria (LR, AIC, and SC) tests. The tests give some conflicting 
results. However, as the rule of thumb, one should choose the shortest lags length provided 
by the tests as long as there is no problem of serial correlation. The appropriate lags length 
are reported in Table 1 
 
                                               
4  The Generalized Impulses as described by Pesaran and Shin (1998) constructs an orthogonal set of 
innovations that does not depend on the VAR ordering. The generalized impulse responses from an 
innovation to the j-th variable are derived by applying a variable specific Cholesky factor computed with the 
j-th variable at the top of the Cholesky ordering. Dekker, Sen and Young (2001) found that the generalized 
approach provided more accurate results than the traditional orthogonalized approach for both impulse 
response and forecast error variance decomposition analysis. 
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TABLE 1. Lags Order and Number of Cointegrating Vector Tests 
 
Periods Lag Order Number of Cointegrating 
Vector(s) 
1997 crisis 3 2 
2002 crisis 2 1 
2007 crisis 4 0 
Note: 
the tests based on sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
 
 
Considering the number of appropriate lags, the number of cointegrating vectors is tested by 
using Johansen and Juselius’s (1990) trace and max statistics. In case of there are 
conflicting results between max and trace statistic, Johansen et al (1990) suggest that the 
trace tends to have more power than the max because trace takes into account all degrees 
of freedom (n-r) of the smallest eigenvalues, then the number of cointegrating vectors 
suggested by the trace statistic would be employed,. With exclusion of linear trend and 95% 
critical values, Table 1 also presents the test outcomes. 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, all series have cointegrating vector, except the one in the 2007 
crisis period. The absence of cointegrating vector on the series of the 2007 crisis, in fact, has 
implication that the indices would not converge to their long run equilibrium. However, it 
does not necessarily mean that the dynamic short run interrelations are not possible to exist 
among the indices. The absence of cointegrating relationship has a consequence that the 
cointegration analysis framework is not appropriate to examine the series. Instead, the VAR 
in first difference would be the most suitable measurement. 
 
In contrast, for the serries, in which the cointegrating vector does exist, the cointegration 
analysis would then properly be employed. Table 1 implicitly shows that degree of 
cointegrating relationship in the first crisis was very high as it contained two cointegrating 
13 
 
vectors. This could happen because the 1997 crisis originally emerged in South East Asia 
region, greatly affected the ASEAN stock markets, as a result of some indifferences in 
macro-economic; stock market characteristics; geographical condition of the countries, that 
most likely had increased the contagious effect of the crisis (Eun et al, 1989; King et al, 1990; 
Pretorius, 2002).  
 
Considering the outcomes of the Johansen Cointegration test, the cointegration analysis 
would then validly be used to estimate the series in the 1997 and the 2002 crisis periods only. 
The NYSE Composite is treated as the world index in these analysis. Based on t-statistic at 
the 5% level of significance, Table 2 shows that during the 1997 crisis, all indices, except STI 
and JAKCOM, had significant influence on the first cointegrating relation. Meanwhile, STI; 
KLSE; and SET significantly affected the second cointegrating vector. In addition, 
NYSEALL; STI; JAKCOM; and SET significantly contributed to the long run equilibrium of 
the observed indices in the second crisis period. The significant contributions of KLSE and 
PSEI to the cointegrating relation in the previous period, however, vanished during this 
period. 
  
TABLE 2. Estimates of Cointegrating Vector 
 
Cointegrating 
Equation: 
PERIODS 
1997 crisis 2002 crisis 
CointEq1 CointEq2 CointEq1 
    
NYSEALL  1.000000  0.000000 1.000000 
    
STI  0.000000  1.000000 -0.503147 
    (0.18572) 
   [-2.70911] 
    
JAKCOM  0.186180  0.919703 -0.342422 
  (0.18019)  (0.50488)  (0.11381) 
 [ 1.03327] [ 1.82163] [-3.00877] 
    
KLSE  1.308215  2.811024  0.321668 
  (0.27975)  (0.78387)  (0.25670) 
 [ 4.67629] [ 3.58609] [ 1.25307] 
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SET -0.543931 -3.410506  0.162479 
  (0.24413)  (0.68406)  (0.05878) 
 [-2.22800] [-4.98568] [ 2.76419] 
    
PSEI -1.394674 -0.951992 -0.188458 
  (0.22680)  (0.63549)  (0.16500) 
 [-6.14936] [-1.49804] [-1.14218] 
    
C -4.332850 -3.224246 -4.570477 
    
Note:  cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and no trends in CE and VAR. 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ], level of significance 5% 
 
Table 3 presents the speed of adjustment coefficients of the error correction term (i) that 
have important implications for the dynamics of the system. A negative value of the 
significant speed of adjustment indicates a downward long run adjustment, while the positive 
one implies an upward long run adjustment. 
  
In the 1997 crisis, the speed of adjustment coefficients for the first cointegrating vector for 
NYSEALL; JAKCOMP; and KLSE are statistically zero, with the critical value of 5%. The 
meaning is that the first cointegrating vector had no contribution to the convergence of those 
indices to their long run path, although NYSEALL and KLSE had significant contribution to 
the first cointegrating vector. In contrast, STI would positively react to a disequilibrium 
among the other indices. For the second cointegrating vector, the speeds of adjustment 
coefficients for all ASEAN-5 indices are statistically significant showing that the 
cointegrating vector had significant contribution to the convergence of the indices to their 
long run equilibrium.  
  
During the 2002 crisis, the ASEAN-5 indices still preserved their significant speed of 
adjustment coefficients, except for KLSE and PSEI. The cointegrating vector, meanwhile, did 
not seem to have significant influence on the convergence of NYSEALL to its long run 
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equilibrium as the speed of adjustment coefficient for NYSEALL was insignificant during the 
period. 
  
TABLE 3. Speed of Adjustment Parameter of the Error Correction Term 
 
Error 
Correction: 
NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE LNSET PSEI 
1997 crisis 
ecm11) -0.001414  0.033795  0.011531 -0.001078  0.055495  0.057323 
  (0.00742)  (0.01286)  (0.01721)  (0.02040)  (0.01650)  (0.01329) 
 [-0.19072] [ 2.62792] [ 0.66991] [-0.05283] [ 3.36353] [ 4.31277] 
ecm2 (2) -7.78E-05 -0.014345 -0.016303 -0.019001 -0.014772 -0.022338 
  (0.00261)  (0.00452)  (0.00606)  (0.00718)  (0.00580)  (0.00468) 
 [-0.02981] [-3.17061] [-2.69228] [-2.64725] [-2.54486] [-4.77702] 
2002 crisis 
ecm3 (4) -0.013544  0.041917  0.086862  0.016842  0.047704  0.024071 
  (0.01743)  (0.01587)  (0.01770)  (0.00993)  (0.01623)  (0.01425) 
 [-0.77690] [ 2.64118] [ 4.90725] [ 1.69635] [ 2.93950] [ 1.68957] 
       
Note : 5% Level of significance, Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 
 
As it was discussed in the previous section, a VECM does not seem to be appropriate for 
estimating the series of the 2007 crisis, since there is no cointegrating vector could be found. 
To overcome this circumstance, it is commonly suggested that a VAR analysis in first 
difference would be the correct specification to examine the series. The VAR analysis, 
however, requires that all variable must be stationary. Therefore, it is necessary to change the 
non stationary variable into the stationary one by differencing process. Following the 
alteration, re-identifying the appropriate lag length is a must. Three lags length is then found 
to be the most suitable lags length to analyze the series using the VAR in first difference. The 
brief result of the analysis can be seen in APPENDIX 1. 
 
After estimating the series using the correct approaches, the analysis will be continued to 
search the existence of granger causality among the indices for each of sub sample period. 
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The objective of granger-causality test is to examine whether the lags of one variable (y1) 
enter into the equation for another variable (y2) 
 
Because the cointegrating relation does not always appear in all sub sample periods, it is 
necessary to conduct the Pairwise Granger Causality on its both different approaches. For the 
series containing cointegrating vector, the Pairwase Granger Causality based on Vector Error 
Correction (VEC) test is employed. Alternatively, the Pairwise Granger Causality based on 
VAR will test the series without cointegrating vector. The results are presented in Table 4. 
 
TABLE 4. Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Exclude 
Jul 1997 –  
Mar 1999 
(df 3)
*
 
Mar 2002 –  
Dec 2003  
(df 2)* 
Jul 2007 –  
Jun 2009 
(df 3) # 
Chi-sq Prob. Chi-sq Prob. Chi-sq Prob. 
NYSEALL STI  2.614057  0.4550  0.259004  0.8785  7.008255  0.0716 
JAKCOM  4.110158  0.2498  1.418158  0.4921  13.66118  0.0034 
KLSE  5.374683  0.1463  2.997849  0.2234  16.87942  0.0007 
SET  6.061856  0.1086  4.742836  0.0933  4.098122  0.2511 
PSEI  1.172762  0.7595  3.679920  0.1588  0.371651  0.9460 
STI NYSEALL  56.86908  0.0000  24.27098  0.0000  121.9620  0.0000 
JAKCOM  7.067365  0.0698  8.003272  0.0183  2.471488  0.4805 
KLSE  5.904097  0.1164  0.741172  0.6903  12.96837  0.0047 
SET  6.950347  0.0735  0.841263  0.6566  15.64265  0.0013 
PSEI  11.17655  0.0108  1.890638  0.3886  1.140004  0.7674 
JAKCOM NYSEALL  34.67810  0.0000  12.50674  0.0019  68.24393  0.0000 
STI  6.337616  0.0963  5.084310  0.0787  3.933439  0.2687 
KLSE  1.968028  0.5791  0.775022  0.6787  6.005274  0.1114 
SET  4.271720  0.2336  2.255533  0.3238  2.755744  0.4308 
PSEI  1.882381  0.5972  4.978605  0.0830  0.564257  0.9046 
KLSE NYSEALL  36.75879  0.0000  38.06731  0.0000  84.53254  0.0000 
STI  5.044251  0.1686  3.302697  0.1918  0.742099  0.8633 
JAKCOM  14.96232  0.0018  0.750906  0.6870  17.60023  0.0005 
SET  0.303004  0.9595  0.084195  0.9588  7.050857  0.0703 
PSEI  2.274629  0.5174  0.173394  0.9170  4.619372  0.2019 
SET NYSEALL  20.70345  0.0001  21.95185  0.0000  78.32838  0.0000 
STI  4.482087  0.2139  0.637977  0.7269  6.313837  0.0973 
JAKCOM  6.402052  0.0936  0.110408  0.9463  16.09597  0.0011 
KLSE  1.720465  0.6324  3.403435  0.1824  17.00103  0.0007 
PSEI  0.613935  0.8932  0.972966  0.6148  2.451477  0.4841 
PSEI NYSEALL  53.92290  0.0000  21.18853  0.0000  239.5704  0.0000 
STI  5.037041  0.1691  0.917941  0.6319  2.662475  0.4466 
JAKCOM  9.208058  0.0266  3.819756  0.1481  12.86560  0.0049 
KLSE  3.041454  0.3853  1.547243  0.4613  4.420627  0.2195 
SET  2.726896  0.4357  3.543533  0.1700  4.515097  0.2109 
Note :  
* Pairwise Granger Causality based on VEC  
# Pairwise Granger Causality based on VAR  
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Table 4 shows that NYSEALL was the only stock index that significantly granger caused all 
the ASEAN-5 indices during the three crises. It suggests that changes or movements in the 
ASEAN-5 indices appeared to lags those of NYSEALL. On the other hand, none of the 
ASEAN indices, except KLSE and JAKCOM during the 2007 crisis, significantly granger 
caused NYSEALL. Thus, the past values of those indices were unable to forecast the present 
value of NYSEALL accurately. In the ASEAN-5’s standpoint, only JAKCOM (in both the 
1997 crisis and the 2002 crisis) and PSEI (in the 1997 crisis) significantly granger caused the 
other ASEAN indices.  
 
Interestingly, in the 2007 crisis, the number of block causality occurred on the series were 
almost twice as many as those in the previous periods. This outcome provides evidence that 
the short run interactions among the observed indices seemed to be more intense during the 
latest period of crisis.   
 
The results of the generalized impulse responses analyses (see APPENDIX 2) show that SET 
and STI had played significant roles to the movements of the other indices during the 1997 
crisis. A shock to SET, where the crisis initially occurred, would result in the second greatest 
contemporaneous response of STI, JAKCOM, and KLSE after their own shock. Meanwhile, a 
shock to STI would be reacted by NYSEALL, SET, and PSEI.    
 
After its own shock, a shock to STI would result in the second largest contemporaneous 
response of NYSEALL and all ASEAN-5 indices during the 2002 crisis. This may imply that 
Singaporean stock market had still played dominant role in the ASEAN-5 stock markets at 
that time. Meanwhile, responses of the ASEAN indices to a shock to NYSEALL were lower 
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during the period compared to those before, although NYSEALL showed its dominance 
among the observed indices in a period later. A shock to NYSEALL had larger impact on all 
ASEAN indices movements, while NYSEALL gave a little or even no reaction to a shock to 
the ASEAN-5 indices in the period. Interestingly, STI’s response to a shock to NYSEALL 
was greater than its own shock. Thus, in general, an immediate response of an index to a 
shock to another increased during the 2007 crisis, even though the responses would, in fact, 
fade away quicker than those before.   
 
While impulse response function traces the effect of a shock to one endogenous variable on 
to the other variables in the system, the variance decomposition separates the variation in an 
endogenous variable into the component shocks to the system. The forecast error variance 
decomposition, thus, tells the proportion of the movements in a sequence due to its own 
shock versus shock to the other variable. This implies that a shock to the i-th variable will not 
only affect that variable, but can also be transmitted to all other variables in the system.  
 
The results of the forecast error variance decompositions for the six share indices (see 
APPENDIX 3) reveal that, in general, the highest percentage of the variance decomposition 
for an index is caused by its domestic shocks. Moreover, APPENDIX 3 also shows that there 
is no specific trend on the value along the sample periods.   
 
The second largest percentage values of the forecast error variance for most ASEAN indices 
were due to an innovation in STI during the 1997 crisis. Meanwhile, the movements of STI 
were largely influenced by the innovation in NYSEALL. During the 2002 crisis, an 
innovation in STI accounted for the second largest proportion of the error variance in the 
ASEAN stock indices’ movements, except the PSEI, after their own shocks. However, the 
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values of the forecast error variance of STI were somewhat lower during the period compared 
to those before.  
 
The proportions of the movements of the indices due to a shock to NYSEALL and STI 
rocketed during the 2007 crisis. NYSEALL greatly influenced STI, SET, and PSEI 
movements. Meanwhile, STI had more influence than NYSEALL on JAKCOM and KLSE 
movements. The higher values of this forecast error variance during the latest crisis compared 
to those before indicate the higher degree of short run interdependence among the variables. 
In general, it may be concluded that the influence of an index to the movement in another 
increased during the 2007 crisis, while the percentage value of the error variance attributable 
to own shocks generally declined. 
   
Conclusion 
  
The study finds two cointegrating vectors on the series of the 1997 crisis, and one 
cointegrating vector on the series of the 2002 crisis. This implies that the stock markets were 
interdependent and had long run equilibrium in the periods. The VECM estimation results 
show that most indices had significant contribution to the cointegrating relationship during 
the both crises. However, the study also detects no indication of cointegrating relationship on 
the indices during the 2007 crisis. These findings prove that the US and the ASEAN-5 stock 
markets integration had been removed by the 2007 crisis, and confirm that stock market 
interdependence is unstable and tend to change overtime.  
 
The block causality tests reveal that more significant causal linkages were discovered during 
the 2007 crisis period compared to those before. The tests together with accounting 
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innovation analysis results give evidences that STI apparently had more explanatory power to 
the other ASEAN indices’ movements during the 1997 crisis, while NYSEALL had played 
dominant role in the 2007 crisis. These outcomes also clarify that the short run dynamic 
interactions among the indices seem to be more intense during the latest period. 
 
The general conclusion that may be withdrawn from this study is that the effects of the 1997 
and the 2002 crisis had influenced the six stock market prices’ movements both in the short 
run and in the long run. Meanwhile, the contagious effect of the 2007 crisis had greatly 
affected the six indices’ movements in the short run, but not in the long run periods. The 
latest crisis had removed the cointegrating relationship of the stock markets. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 
 DLNYSEALL DLSTI DLJAKCOM DLKLSE DLSET DLPSEI 
DLNYSEALL(-1) -0.195603  0.444076  0.362900  0.216314  0.330846  0.470399 
  (0.05068)  (0.04071)  (0.04406)  (0.02418)  (0.03762)  (0.03295) 
 [-3.85937] [ 10.9079] [ 8.23570] [ 8.94564] [ 8.79399] [ 14.2762] 
       
DLNYSEALL(-2) -0.135354  0.277216  0.156839  0.034378  0.188618 -0.018417 
  (0.06386)  (0.05130)  (0.05552)  (0.03047)  (0.04740)  (0.04152) 
 [-2.11958] [ 5.40431] [ 2.82492] [ 1.12836] [ 3.97906] [-0.44361] 
       
DLNYSEALL(-3)  0.050535  0.146388  0.134600  0.037208  0.098975  0.009460 
  (0.06300)  (0.05061)  (0.05478)  (0.03006)  (0.04677)  (0.04096) 
 [ 0.80211] [ 2.89259] [ 2.45728] [ 1.23784] [ 2.11632] [ 0.23097] 
       
DLSTI(-1)  0.191258 -0.097225 -0.018818  0.010690 -0.091828  0.074161 
  (0.08296)  (0.06663)  (0.07212)  (0.03958)  (0.06158)  (0.05393) 
 [ 2.30556] [-1.45907] [-0.26092] [ 0.27010] [-1.49124] [ 1.37510] 
       
DLSTI(-2)  0.027650 -0.091301 -0.036468 -0.014135 -0.043481  0.022143 
  (0.08158)  (0.06553)  (0.07092)  (0.03892)  (0.06055)  (0.05304) 
 [ 0.33894] [-1.39332] [-0.51418] [-0.36317] [-0.71804] [ 0.41752] 
       
DLSTI(-3)  0.106161 -0.019429  0.126216 -0.026590  0.106843  0.044087 
  (0.07726)  (0.06206)  (0.06717)  (0.03686)  (0.05735)  (0.05023) 
 [ 1.37401] [-0.31306] [ 1.87893] [-0.72132] [ 1.86290] [ 0.87769] 
       
DLJAKCOM(-1)  0.154794  0.054009  0.081310  0.125666  0.113461  0.139254 
  (0.06978)  (0.05605)  (0.06066)  (0.03329)  (0.05179)  (0.04536) 
 [ 2.21844] [ 0.96362] [ 1.34032] [ 3.77483] [ 2.19058] [ 3.06978] 
       
DLJAKCOM(-2)  0.213048  0.046526  0.068041  0.049874  0.167406  0.046558 
  (0.07137)  (0.05733)  (0.06205)  (0.03405)  (0.05298)  (0.04640) 
 [ 2.98495] [ 0.81152] [ 1.09648] [ 1.46460] [ 3.15971] [ 1.00336] 
       
DLJAKCOM(-3) -0.016671 -0.051907 -0.086522 -0.038121 -0.057379 -0.071334 
  (0.07144)  (0.05739)  (0.06211)  (0.03409)  (0.05303)  (0.04645) 
 [-0.23335] [-0.90450] [-1.39297] [-1.11840] [-1.08196] [-1.53583] 
       
DLKLSE(-1) -0.293605 -0.134793 -0.124978 -0.135580 -0.133783  0.059341 
  (0.11638)  (0.09348)  (0.10118)  (0.05552)  (0.08639)  (0.07566) 
 [-2.52291] [-1.44194] [-1.23522] [-2.44185] [-1.54867] [ 0.78433] 
       
DLKLSE(-2) -0.405527 -0.178074 -0.166502 -0.144808 -0.314605 -0.061157 
  (0.11652)  (0.09360)  (0.10130)  (0.05559)  (0.08649)  (0.07575) 
 [-3.48033] [-1.90259] [-1.64359] [-2.60483] [-3.63735] [-0.80733] 
       
DLKLSE(-3) -0.061016  0.228061  0.119153  0.176802  0.087526  0.127988 
  (0.11607)  (0.09323)  (0.10091)  (0.05538)  (0.08616)  (0.07546) 
 [-0.52569] [ 2.44612] [ 1.18076] [ 3.19268] [ 1.01588] [ 1.69612] 
       
DLSET(-1) -0.129921 -0.223772  0.006069 -0.082932 -0.170231 -0.102307 
  (0.07948)  (0.06384)  (0.06910)  (0.03792)  (0.05900)  (0.05167) 
 [-1.63466] [-3.50508] [ 0.08783] [-2.18705] [-2.88541] [-1.97998] 
       
DLSET(-2) -0.049153  0.003339 -0.048105  0.051002  0.001588 -0.042500 
  (0.07963)  (0.06396)  (0.06923)  (0.03799)  (0.05911)  (0.05177) 
 [-0.61729] [ 0.05221] [-0.69486] [ 1.34249] [ 0.02686] [-0.82097] 
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DLSET(-3) -0.082612 -0.112591 -0.104078 -0.015746 -0.026827 -0.010035 
  (0.07910)  (0.06353)  (0.06877)  (0.03774)  (0.05871)  (0.05142) 
 [-1.04446] [-1.77213] [-1.51349] [-0.41726] [-0.45691] [-0.19516] 
       
DLPSEI(-1) -0.025680 -0.038321  0.027957  0.057543  0.025716  0.047445 
  (0.07492)  (0.06018)  (0.06514)  (0.03575)  (0.05562)  (0.04871) 
 [-0.34275] [-0.63673] [ 0.42918] [ 1.60976] [ 0.46239] [ 0.97403] 
       
DLPSEI(-2) -0.034663  0.052607  0.038345  0.046933  0.071260  0.059935 
  (0.07508)  (0.06031)  (0.06528)  (0.03582)  (0.05573)  (0.04881) 
 [-0.46168] [ 0.87230] [ 0.58743] [ 1.31018] [ 1.27861] [ 1.22788] 
       
DLPSEI(-3) -0.011395 -0.001747  0.007863 -0.014698  0.036463 -0.052252 
  (0.06542)  (0.05255)  (0.05688)  (0.03121)  (0.04856)  (0.04253) 
 [-0.17419] [-0.03325] [ 0.13825] [-0.47091] [ 0.75089] [-1.22858] 
       
C -0.001534 -0.000289  0.000484 -0.000191 -0.000122 -0.000194 
  (0.00098)  (0.00079)  (0.00085)  (0.00047)  (0.00073)  (0.00064) 
 [-1.56402] [-0.36628] [ 0.56758] [-0.40856] [-0.16806] [-0.30427] 
 R-squared  0.100398  0.230530  0.194794  0.242115  0.216041  0.425265 
 Adj. R-squared  0.068013  0.202829  0.165807  0.214831  0.187818  0.404574 
 Sum sq. resids  0.244826  0.157969  0.185061  0.055730  0.134902  0.103478 
 S.E. equation  0.022128  0.017775  0.019239  0.010557  0.016426  0.014386 
 F-statistic  3.100085  8.322097  6.719972  8.873936  7.654892  20.55367 
 Log likelihood  1251.111  1364.811  1323.735  1635.179  1405.771  1474.588 
 Akaike AIC -4.748018 -5.186168 -5.027881 -6.228051 -5.344012 -5.609203 
 Schwarz SC -4.592360 -5.030511 -4.872223 -6.072394 -5.188355 -5.453546 
 Mean dependent -0.001003 -0.000794 -0.000142 -0.000470 -0.000581 -0.000802 
 S.D. dependent  0.022921  0.019908  0.021064  0.011915  0.018226  0.018643 
Note : Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
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APPENDIX 2 
The Generalized Impulse Responses 
 
 
Period : 1997 CRISIS 
Response of NYSEALL: 
 Period NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.011294  0.001894  3.50E-05 -0.000422  0.000981  0.001813 
 2  0.011179  0.002411  0.001467  0.000586  0.002374  0.002265 
 3  0.010961  0.003150  0.001510  0.001395  0.002335  0.002936 
 5  0.010652  0.002985  0.001562  0.000722  0.001683  0.002797 
  
Response of STI: 
 Period NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.003284  0.019586  0.007672  0.006028  0.008344  0.008376 
 2  0.010915  0.023998  0.010779  0.008569  0.011269  0.013220 
 3  0.010376  0.023536  0.013380  0.010957  0.011575  0.012111 
 5  0.011579  0.023623  0.013080  0.010935  0.012507  0.011469 
  
Response of JAKCOM: 
 Period NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  8.12E-05  0.010268  0.026214  0.005306  0.010493  0.007760 
 2  0.007639  0.011814  0.031123  0.006143  0.015756  0.011107 
 3  0.007788  0.009310  0.031444  0.004782  0.016311  0.009009 
 5  0.007619  0.007262  0.028842  0.002817  0.014932  0.007452 
 
Response of KLSE: 
 Period NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1 -0.001162  0.009562  0.006289  0.031070  0.009323  0.003265 
 2  0.007972  0.010749  0.010153  0.028568  0.011812  0.006343 
 3  0.007228  0.011007  0.015137  0.029008  0.015385  0.009234 
 5  0.008535  0.011865  0.013562  0.026295  0.016428  0.009031 
  
Response of SET: 
 Period NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.002183  0.010705  0.010058  0.007540  0.025128  0.007935 
 2  0.008371  0.014641  0.013822  0.007961  0.027964  0.010217 
 3  0.010580  0.013447  0.014809  0.008455  0.027294  0.009532 
 5  0.013152  0.014316  0.015034  0.009772  0.027117  0.008877 
  
Response of PSEI: 
 Period NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.003250  0.008657  0.005993  0.002127  0.006392  0.020243 
 2  0.011151  0.014619  0.011040  0.006005  0.012386  0.024080 
 3  0.011797  0.012628  0.011115  0.006454  0.013414  0.021652 
 5  0.012731  0.010825  0.010852  0.005787  0.012701  0.018949 
Period : 2002 CRISIS 
Response of NYSEALL: 
 Period NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.012450  0.002813  0.001167 -0.000655  0.001306 -0.000450 
 2  0.011878  0.002635  0.001134 -0.000183  0.000388  0.000190 
 3  0.012297  0.002907  0.000640  0.000112 -0.000196 -0.000734 
 5  0.011752  0.002857  0.000548  0.000170 -0.000421 -0.000828 
  
Response of STI: 
 Period NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
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 1  0.002561  0.011334  0.002665  0.003670  0.004259  0.001479 
 2  0.005641  0.011629  0.001319  0.003225  0.004403  0.001317 
 3  0.005533  0.011694  0.001144  0.003880  0.003994  0.002170 
 5  0.006522  0.011643  0.000947  0.003994  0.003970  0.001633 
  
Response of JAKCOM: 
 Period NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.001185  0.002972  0.012641  0.003045  0.002917  0.000722 
 2  0.003495  0.003792  0.013718  0.003020  0.002976  0.000290 
 3  0.002551  0.004254  0.013010  0.003820  0.002466  0.001527 
 5  0.004741  0.004019  0.012337  0.003901  0.002605  0.001199 
  
Response of KLSE: 
 Period NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1 -0.000373  0.002296  0.001708  0.007090  0.001993  0.000979 
 2  0.001873  0.003584  0.002432  0.008040  0.002640  0.001051 
 3  0.001670  0.003989  0.002420  0.008746  0.002757  0.001104 
 5  0.002216  0.004076  0.002149  0.009009  0.002702  0.000875 
  
Response of SET: 
 Period NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.001216  0.004356  0.002675  0.003258  0.011590  0.001371 
 2  0.004130  0.005110  0.003153  0.004218  0.012126  0.001817 
 3  0.004254  0.005675  0.003279  0.004734  0.012750  0.002018 
 5  0.005402  0.005595  0.002773  0.005011  0.012688  0.001535 
  
Response of PSEI: 
 Period NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1 -0.000368  0.001327  0.000581  0.001405  0.001204  0.010174 
 2  0.002386  0.002829  0.001904  0.001521  0.002759  0.011542 
 3  0.002756  0.003182  0.002174  0.002116  0.003287  0.011914 
 5  0.003660  0.003331  0.001890  0.002479  0.003324  0.011742 
Period : 2007 CRISIS 
Response of NYSEALL: 
 Period NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.022128  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2 -0.003640  0.002096  0.001145 -0.002708 -0.001671 -0.000338 
 3 -0.002053 -0.000850  0.001235 -0.003008 -0.000324 -0.000711 
 5 -0.000627 -0.000432 -0.000401  0.000343 -0.000713 -0.000187 
 
 Response of STI: 
 Period NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.007729  0.016006  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.007474 -0.003544 -0.000320 -0.001482 -0.002866 -0.000504 
 3  0.001135 -6.69E-05  0.000544 -0.002107  0.000328  0.000409 
 5 -0.001095  8.97E-05 -0.000117 -0.000959 -0.000416 -0.000182 
 
 Response of JAKCOM: 
 Period NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.004991  0.010799  0.015119  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.008122  6.01E-05  0.001029 -0.001009  0.000137  0.000368 
 3  0.001882 -0.000130  0.000975 -0.002295 -0.000987  0.000346 
 5 -8.58E-05 -9.00E-05 -0.000611 -0.000604 -0.001033 -0.000396 
 
 Response of KLSE: 
 Period NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.002176  0.005260  0.002439  0.008551  0.000000  0.000000 
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 2  0.004777  0.000365  0.001490 -0.001146 -0.000904  0.000757 
 3  0.000860  0.000794  0.000915 -0.001529  0.000588  0.000490 
 5  0.000219  0.000217 -0.000135 -0.000473 -0.000521 -2.09E-05 
 
 Response of SET: 
 Period NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.006666  0.007750  0.003085  0.001150  0.012429  0.000000 
 2  0.005809 -0.002181  0.000943 -0.001291 -0.002059  0.000338 
 3  0.001850  0.001117  0.002206 -0.003042  0.000344  0.000771 
 5  0.000599 -0.000452 -0.000214 -0.001004 -0.001076 -0.000264 
 
 Response of PSEI: 
 Period NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.002234  0.003345  0.003066  0.001893  0.002200  0.013151 
 2  0.011230  0.002369  0.002080  0.000480 -0.001167  0.000624 
 3 -9.13E-05  0.001495  0.001356 -0.001896 -0.001274  0.000683 
 5  0.000410 -0.000354 -0.001057  0.000196 -0.000965 -0.000310 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
The Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
 
Period : 1997 CRISIS 
Variance Decomposition of NYSEALL: 
 Period S.E. NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.011294  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.015996  98.69423  0.115669  0.686075  0.228377  0.275484  0.000165 
 3  0.019524  97.76285  0.542101  0.740642  0.647543  0.228170  0.078694 
 5  0.024883  97.44471  0.849489  0.881230  0.531706  0.153177  0.139688 
  
Variance Decomposition of STI: 
 Period S.E. NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.019586  2.812237  97.18776  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.031952  12.72649  86.04064  0.386171  0.299347  0.003141  0.544210 
 3  0.040751  14.30721  82.33046  1.733095  1.206779  0.020821  0.401631 
 5  0.054607  16.61089  78.67026  2.397502  2.062958  0.021172  0.237212 
  
Variance Decomposition of JAKCOM: 
 Period S.E. NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.026214  0.000960  15.74536  84.25368  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.041595  3.373370  12.85172  82.95315  0.023245  0.743387  0.055125 
 3  0.053177  4.208674  10.19452  84.12983  0.014374  1.399978  0.052624 
 5  0.069098  4.891248  7.705599  85.25207  0.045771  2.010709  0.094600 
  
Variance Decomposition of KLSE: 
 Period S.E. NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.031070  0.139852  10.14706  0.688047  89.02504  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.043438  3.439659  10.02292  2.879919  83.50964  0.094575  0.053285 
 3  0.054018  4.014669  9.864042  6.939436  78.26062  0.572307  0.348929 
 5  0.069395  5.317503  11.14246  8.719200  72.83742  1.559373  0.424039 
  
Variance Decomposition of SET: 
 Period S.E. NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.025128  0.754794  17.41874  6.520932  2.500015  72.80552  0.000000 
 2  0.038222  5.122468  19.86930  8.643812  1.883525  64.46710  0.013792 
 3  0.047914  8.135075  18.75081  10.75123  2.048744  60.25930  0.054837 
 5  0.063531  12.89458  18.19347  12.16377  2.600717  53.92083  0.226630 
 
 Variance Decomposition of PSEI: 
 Period S.E. NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.020243  2.577526  16.52298  2.138976  0.104570  1.371898  77.28405 
 2  0.032917  12.45070  21.68224  4.588497  0.365133  2.638350  58.27508 
 3  0.041051  16.26366  20.86563  6.199126  0.772548  4.175797  51.72323 
 5  0.052498  21.38888  18.66306  8.596656  1.181175  5.287735  44.88249 
Period : 2002 CRISIS 
Variance Decomposition of NYSEALL: 
 Period S.E. NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.012450  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.017257  99.42759  0.000822  0.000357  0.081338  0.347134  0.142758 
 3  0.021290  98.68593  0.004391  0.068802  0.224608  0.906210  0.110057 
 5  0.027242  97.82271  0.012228  0.150382  0.365734  1.547841  0.101104 
  
Variance Decomposition of STI: 
 Period S.E. NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.011334  5.104263  94.89574  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.016609  13.91160  85.14912  0.916598  0.008012  0.014289  0.000376 
 3  0.020644  16.18862  82.08385  1.336985  0.176957  0.040426  0.173164 
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 5  0.027233  20.60032  76.95414  1.812370  0.424021  0.062763  0.146383 
  
Variance Decomposition of JAKCOM: 
 Period S.E. NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.012641  0.878785  4.822366  94.29885  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.018796  3.854820  4.870225  91.17330  0.007768  0.052299  0.041583 
 3  0.022966  3.815433  5.964691  89.74053  0.060737  0.285950  0.132663 
 5  0.029390  6.735472  6.115198  86.31521  0.274659  0.399194  0.160264 
  
Variance Decomposition of KLSE: 
 Period S.E. NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.007090  0.276578  11.87753  3.070812  84.77508  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.010975  3.028254  13.69924  3.378816  79.89016  0.002260  0.001272 
 3  0.014214  3.186540  14.96976  3.117539  78.70490  0.015059  0.006210 
 5  0.019447  4.131474  15.26610  2.442993  78.05288  0.051236  0.055314 
  
Variance Decomposition of SET: 
 Period S.E. NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.011590  1.100203  13.06534  2.125002  2.198277  81.51117  0.000000 
 2  0.017061  6.368505  12.34580  2.192878  3.812806  75.21417  0.065836 
 3  0.021556  7.884349  12.77231  2.127543  4.615550  72.50301  0.097239 
 5  0.028733  11.03449  12.30528  1.683873  5.925766  68.99166  0.058928 
  
Variance Decomposition of PSEI: 
 Period S.E. NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.010174  0.130568  2.024716  0.090726  0.790393  0.346184  96.61741 
 2  0.015706  2.363276  3.089296  0.620398  0.519142  1.097334  92.31055 
 3  0.020051  3.339145  3.613083  0.853332  0.682595  1.522036  89.98981 
 5  0.026773  5.279464  3.950051  0.813465  1.142809  1.728592  87.08562 
Period : 2007 CRISIS 
Variance Decomposition of NYSEALL: 
 Period S.E. NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.022128  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.022778  96.92653  0.846727  0.252543  1.413872  0.538341  0.021983 
 3  0.023129  94.79387  0.956121  0.530013  3.062300  0.541763  0.115931 
 5  0.023304  93.80505  0.988212  1.240915  3.130366  0.688871  0.146583 
 
 Variance Decomposition of STI: 
 Period S.E. NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.017775  18.90874  81.09126  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.019878  29.25720  68.01832  0.025927  0.556103  2.078167  0.064278 
 3  0.020036  29.11837  66.95121  0.099306  1.653734  2.072404  0.104967 
 5  0.020235  28.88500  65.67577  0.152433  2.133314  2.902927  0.250555 
 
 Variance Decomposition of JAKCOM: 
 Period S.E. NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.019239  6.730021  31.50840  61.76158  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.020936  20.73163  26.60704  52.39405  0.232156  0.004278  0.030840 
 3  0.021194  21.01858  25.96700  51.33777  1.398802  0.221100  0.056750 
 5  0.021398  21.08590  25.77075  50.58992  1.482229  0.961696  0.109504 
 
 Variance Decomposition of KLSE: 
 Period S.E. NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.010557  4.247589  24.81842  5.337181  65.59681  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.011804  19.77650  19.94850  5.862433  53.41481  0.586740  0.411018 
 3  0.012020  19.58597  19.67591  6.233857  53.13594  0.805546  0.562772 
 5  0.012115  19.48774  19.46899  6.149745  52.95124  1.256394  0.685887 
 
 Variance Decomposition of SET: 
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 Period S.E. NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.016426  16.46728  22.25885  3.527946  0.489780  57.25614  0.000000 
 2  0.017754  24.80051  20.56146  3.301644  0.947907  50.35219  0.036286 
 3  0.018295  24.37809  19.73609  4.562671  3.658049  47.45349  0.211600 
 5  0.018515  24.54167  20.01009  4.552055  3.874974  46.79101  0.230203 
 
 Variance Decomposition of PSEI: 
 Period S.E. NYSEALL STI JAKCOM KLSE SET PSEI 
 1  0.014386  2.411756  5.405031  4.543029  1.731093  2.338218  83.57087 
 2  0.018574  38.00412  4.868794  3.979295  1.105116  1.797539  50.24514 
 3  0.018835  36.96001  5.365022  4.388070  2.087949  2.205803  48.99315 
 5  0.018948  36.58706  5.336441  4.671211  2.192331  2.513771  48.69918 
Note : Cholesky Ordering: LNSTI LNJAKCOM LNKLSE LNSET LNPSEI 
  
